In studying how to communicate over a public channel with an active adversary, Dodis and Wichs introduced the notion of a non-malleable extractor. A non-malleable extractor dramatically strengthens the notion of a strong extractor. A strong extractor takes two inputs, a weakly-random x and a uniformly random seed y, and outputs a string which appears uniform, even given y. For a non-malleable extractor nmExt, the output nmExt(x, y) should appear uniform given y as well as nmExt(x, A(y)), where A is an arbitrary function with A(y) = y.
INTRODUCTION
Bennett, Brassard, and Robert [1] introduced the basic cryptographic question of privacy amplification. Suppose Alice and Bob share an n-bit secret key X, which is weakly random. This could occur because the secret is a password or biometric data, neither of which is uniformly random, or because an adversary Eve managed to learn some information about a secret which Yevgeniy Dodis was partially supported by NSF Grants CNS-1065288, CNS-1017471, CNS-0831299 and Google Faculty Award. Xin Li and David Zuckerman were partially supported by NSF Grants CCF-0634811, CCF-0916160 and THECB ARP Grant 003658-0113-2007. Trevor D. Wooley was supported by a Royal Society Wolfson Research Merit Award. previously was uniformly random. How can Alice and Bob communicate over a public channel to transform X into a nearly uniform secret key, about which Eve has negligible information? We measure the randomness in X using min-entropy.
Definition 1.1. The min-entropy of a random variable X is H ∞ (X) = min x∈supp(X) log 2 (1/ Pr[X = x]). For X ∈ {0, 1} n , we call X an (n, H ∞ (X))-source, and we say X has entropy rate H ∞ (X)/n.
We assume Eve has unlimited computational power. If Eve is passive, i.e., cannot corrupt the communication between Alice and Bob, then it is not hard to use randomness extractors [2] to solve this problem. In particular, a strong extractor suffices. Notation. We let [s] denote the set {1, 2, . . . , s}. For a positive integer, U denotes the uniform distribution on {0, 1} , and for S a set, U S denotes the uniform distribution on S. When used as a component in a vector, each U or U S is assumed independent of the other components. We say W ≈ ε Z if the random variables W and Z have distributions which are ε-close in variation distance. Definition 1.2. A function Ext : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} d → {0, 1} m is a strong (k, ε)-extractor if for every source X with min-entropy k and independent Y which is
Using such an extractor, the case when Eve is passive can be solved as follows. Alice chooses a fresh random string Y and sends it to Bob. They then both compute Ext(X, Y ). The property of the strong extractor guarantees that even given Y , the output is close to uniform.
The case when Eve is active, i.e., can corrupt the communication, has recently received attention. Maurer and Wolf [3] gave a one-round protocol which works when the entropy rate of the weakly-random secret X is bigger than 2/3. This was later improved by Dodis, Katz, Reyzin, and Smith [4] to work for entropy rate bigger than 1/2. However in both cases the resulting nearly-uniform secret key R is significantly shorter than the min-entropy of X. Dodis and Wichs [5] showed that there is no one-round protocol for entropy rate less than 1/2. Renner and Wolf [6] gave the first protocol which works for entropy rate below 1/2. Kanukurthi and Reyzin [7] simplified their protocol and showed that the protocol can run in O(s) rounds and achieve entropy loss O(s 2 ) to achieve security parameter s. (Recall that a protocol achieves security parameter s if Eve cannot predict with advantage more than 2 −s over random. For an active adversary, we further require that Eve cannot force Alice and Bob to output different secrets and not abort with probability more than 2 −s .) Dodis and Wichs [5] improved the number of rounds to 2 but did not improve the entropy loss. Chandran, Kanukurthi, Ostrovsky, and Reyzin [8] improved the entropy loss to O(s) but the number of rounds remained O(s). The natural open question is therefore whether there is a 2-round protocol with entropy loss O(s).
Dodis and Wichs showed how such a protocol could be built using non-malleable extractors, which they defined. In the following definition of (worst-case) nonmalleable extractor, think of an adversary changing the value of the seed via the function A.
is a (k, ε)-non-malleable extractor if, for any source X with H ∞ (X) ≥ k and any function A : [D] → [D] such that A(y) = y for all y, the following holds. When Y is chosen uniformly from [D] and independent of X,
Note that this dramatically strengthens the definition of strong extractor. In a strong extractor, the output must be indistinguishable from uniform, even given the random seed. For a non-malleable extractor, a distinguisher is not only given a random seed, but also the output of the extractor with the given input and an arbitrarily correlated random seed. Note that nmExt(X, A(Y )) need not be close to uniform. The above "worst-case" definition is slightly weaker than the "average-case" definition needed by applications, but Dodis and Wichs showed that any worst-case (k, ε)-non-malleable extractor is also an average-case (k − log(1/ε), 2ε)-nonmalleable extractor.
Unfortunately, Dodis and Wichs were not able to construct such non-malleable extractors. Instead, they constructed "look-ahead extractors," which are weaker than non-malleable extractors, but nevertheless yielded the two-round, O(s 2 )-entropy loss protocol. Dodis and Wichs also showed the existence of nonmalleable extractors. The existence of excellent standard randomness extractors can be shown by the probabilistic method in a straightforward way. For non-malleable extractors, the argument requires more work. Nevertheless, Dodis and Wichs showed that non-malleable extractors exist with k > 2m + 3 log(1/ε) + log d + 9 and d > log(n − k + 1) + 2 log(1/ε) + 7, for N = 2 n , M = 2 m , and D = 2 d .
The definition of non-malleable extractor is so strong that before our work, no explicit construction was known for any length seed achieving a one-bit output, even for min-entropy k = .99n. For example, a first attempt might be f (x, y) = x · y, where the inner product is taken over GF (2) . However, this fails, even for min-entropy n − 1. To see this, take X to be the bit 0 concatenated with U n−1 . Let A(y) be y with the first bit flipped. Then for all x in the support of X, one has f (x, y) = f (x, A(y)).
Although general Hadamard codes don't work, we nevertheless show that a specific near-Hadamard code that comes from the Paley graph works for min-entropy k > n/2. The Paley graph function is nmExt(x, y) = χ(x − y), where x and y are viewed as elements in a finite field F of odd order q and χ is the quadratic character χ(x) = x (q−1)/2 . (The output of χ is in {±1}, which we convert to an element of {0, 1}.) The function nmExt(x, y) = χ(x + y) works equally well. The proof involves estimating a nontrivial character sum.
We can output m bits by computing the discrete logarithm log g (x + y) mod M . This extractor was originally introduced by Chor and Goldreich [9] in the context of two-source extractors. To make this efficient, we need M to divide q−1. A widely-believed conjecture about primes in arithmetic progressions implies that such a q is not too large (see Conjecture 2.3). Our result is stated as follows. As a direct corollary of Theorem 1.4 and the protocol of Dodis and Wichs, we obtain a 2-round protocol for privacy amplification with optimal entropy loss, when the entropy rate is 1/2+α for any α > 0. This improves the significant entropy loss in the one-round protocols of Dodis, Katz, Reyzin, and Smith [4] and Kanukurthi and Reyzin [10] .
Next, we use our non-malleable extractor to give a constant-round privacy amplification protocol with optimal entropy loss, when the entropy rate is δ for any constant δ > 0. This significantly improves the round complexity of [7] and [8] . It also significantly improves the entropy loss of [5] , at the price of a larger, but still comparable (O(1) vs. 2), round complexity. Our result is stated as follows. Subsequent work. Following our work, Cohen, Raz, and Segev [11] gave an alternative construction of a non-malleable extractor for min-entropy rate 1/2 + α. Their construction has the advantage that it works for any seed length d with 2.01 log n ≤ d ≤ n, although their output length m remains small if d is small, i.e., m = Θ(d). They further do not rely on any unproven assumption. Our construction, or at least the one-bit version, appears to be a special case of their construction.
Inspired by their elegant work, we subsequently used related ideas to strengthen our character sum and show that our non-malleable extractor works even if the seed has entropy only Θ(m + log n). For more details, see the full version [12] .
PRELIMINARIES
We often use capital letters for random variables and corresponding small letters for their instantiations. Let |S| denote the cardinality of the set S. Let Z r denote the cyclic group Z/(rZ), and let F q denote the finite field of size q. All logarithms are to the base 2.
Definition 2.1. Let W and Z be two distributions on a set S. Their statistical distance (variation distance) is
For a distribution D on a set S and a function h : S → T , let h(D) denote the distribution on T induced by choosing x according to D and outputting h(x). We often view a distribution as a function whose value at a sample point is the probability of that sample point. Thus W − Z 1 denotes the 1 norm of the difference of the distributions specified by the random variables W and Z, which equals 2∆(W, Z).
AVERAGE CONDITIONAL MIN-ENTROPY. Dodis and
Wichs originally defined non-malleable extractors with respect to average conditional min-entropy, a notion defined by Dodis, Ostrovsky, Reyzin, and Smith [13] .
Definition 2.2. The average conditional min-entropy is defined as
Average conditional min-entropy tends to be useful for cryptographic applications. By taking W to be the empty string, we see that average conditional minentropy is at least as strong as min-entropy. In fact, the two are essentially equivalent, up to a small loss in parameters. Therefore, worst-case non-malleable extractor and average-case non-malleable extractor are also essentially equivalent.
Throughout the rest of our paper, when we say nonmalleable extractor, we refer to the worst-case nonmalleable extractor of Definition 1.3.
PRIMES IN ARITHMETIC PROGRESSIONS. To output more than log n bits, we will rely on a well-known conjecture about primes in arithmetic progressions. This conjecture is widely believed for c = 2, all r, and all b relatively prime to r. For more on this conjecture, see the discussions in the full version [12] .
FOURIER ANALYSIS. The following definitions from Fourier analysis are standard (see e.g., [14] ) , although we normalize differently than in many computer science papers, such as [15] . For functions f, g from a set S to C, we define the inner product f, g = x∈S f (x)g(x). Let G be a finite abelian group, and let φ a character of G, i.e., a homomorphism from G to C × . We call the character that maps all elements to 1 the trivial character. Define the Fourier coefficient
For functions f, g : S → C, we define the function
. Thus, the characters of the group G × G are the functions (φ, φ ), where φ and φ range over all characters of G. We abbreviate the Fourier coefficient
We'll need the following extension of Vazirani's XOR lemma. We can't use traditional versions of the XOR lemma, because our output may not be uniform. Our statement and proof parallels Rao [15] . We thus defer the proof to the full version [12] . Lemma 2.4. Let (W, W ) be a random variable on G × G for a finite abelian group G, and suppose that for all characters φ, φ on G with φ nontrivial, one has
THE NON-MALLEABLE EXTRACTOR
Our basic extractor was introduced by Chor and Goldreich [9] . They showed that it was a two-source extractor for entropy rates bigger than 1/2. Dodis and Oliveira [16] showed that it was strong. Neither result implies anything about non-malleability.
To output m bits, we set M = 2 m and choose a prime power q > M . In our basic extractor, we require that M |(q − 1). Later, we remove this assumption. Fix a generator g of F × q . We define nmExt :
Here log g z is the discrete logarithm of z with respect to g, and h :
In the special case m = 1, we only require that q is odd. In this case, nmExt(x, y) corresponds to the quadratic character of x + y, converted to {0, 1} output. This is efficient to compute. Since there is no known efficient deterministic algorithm to find an n-bit prime, we may take q = 3 , with 3 −1 < 2 n < 3 .
For general M , we use the Pohlig-Hellman algorithm to compute the discrete log mod M . This runs in polynomial time in the largest prime factor of M . Since in our case M = 2 m , this is polynomial time.
We still need a prime or prime power q such that M |(q − 1). Unconditionally, we get a polynomial-time algorithm to output m = c log n bits for any c > 0. To output more bits efficiently, we rely on a widely believed conjecture. Under Conjecture 2.3, such a prime can be found efficiently by testing M + 1, 2M + 1, 3M + 1, . . . in succession. Now we show nmExt is a non-malleable extractor.
Theorem 3.1. The above function nmExt :
Proof: The heart of our proof is a new character sum estimate, given in Theorem 4.2 (and Corollary 4.3). We now show how to deduce Theorem 3.1 from the character sum estimate and Lemma 2.4. Let X be a distribution with H ∞ (X) ≥ k, and let Y be uniform on F q . As is well-known, we may assume without loss of generality that X is uniform on a set of size 2 k . We set G = Z M , (W, W ) = (nmExt(X, Y ), nmExt(X, A(Y ))), and we condition on Y = y.
Since M |(q −1), we have that for φ a character of G, the function χ(z) = φ(h(log g (z))) is a multiplicative character of F q . Therefore, Corollary 4.3 shows that
Note that this theorem assumes that the seed is chosen uniformly from F q , consistent with Definition 1.3. However, we may desire to have the seed be a uniformly random bit string. This causes a problem, since we may not be able to choose q close to a power of 2. If we use a d-bit seed where 2 d ≤ q < 2 d+1 , then we can view the seed as an integer between 0 and 2 d −1, or simply as an element of F q with min-entropy at least (log q) − 1. We can handle this by using our non-malleable extractor with a weakly-random seed. 
In fact, it can be easily shown (see the full version [12] ) that a (k, ε)-non-malleable extractor nmExt :
is also a (k, k , ε )-non-malleable extractor with ε = (D/2 k )ε. Thus by letting d = log 2 q , which is n + c log n + O(1) under Conjecture 2.3, we have 
A CHARACTER SUM ESTIMATE
We now prove the necessary character sum estimate. We prove a somewhat more general statement than is needed for the one-bit extractor, as the general statement is needed to output many bits. Throughout this section, we take F = F q to be a finite field with q elements. In addition, we suppose that χ : F × → C × is a nontrivial character of order d = q − 1, and we extend the domain of χ to F by taking χ(0) = 0. The following lemma is a consequence of Weil's resolution of the Riemann Hypothesis for curves over finite fields (see [17] ). In this context, we say that a polynomial f ∈ F[x] has m distinct roots when f has m distinct roots in the algebraic closure F of F, or equivalently that such holds in a splitting field for f .
Proof: This is immediate from Theorem 2C of Schmidt [18] (see page 43 of the latter source).
We next consider two arbitrary characters, where the first is nontrivial; without loss of generality we may take these to be χ a (x) = (χ(x)) a and χ b (x) = (χ(x)) b , where 0 < a < q − 1 and 0 ≤ b < q − 1. Now we establish the main character sum estimate. Note that we need the assumption that a = 0: if a = 0 and b = (q − 1)/2, we could take A(y) = 0 and let S be the set of quadratic residues, and then one has no cancellation in the character sum. (1) Applying Cauchy's inequality a second time, we deduce that
By positivity, the sum over s and t may be extended from S to the entire set F, and thus we deduce that Θ 4 q 2 |S| 2 s,t∈F y,z∈F ψ s,t (y)ψ s,t (z).
(2)
On recalling the definition (1), we may expand the right hand side of (2) to obtain the bound
where ν(y, z) = s∈F χ a (s+y)χ b (s+A(y))χ a (s+z)χ b (s+A(z)).
Recall now the hypothesis that y = A(y). It follows that, considered as an element of F[x], the polynomial
can be a dth power only when y = z, or when y = A(z), a = b and z = A(y). In order to confirm this assertion, observe first that when y = z and y = A(z), then h y,z has a zero of multiplicity a at −y. Next, when y = A(z), one has z = y, and so when a = b the polynomial h y,z has a zero of multiplicity q − 1 + a − b at −y. Finally, when y = A(z) and a = b, then provided that z = A(y) one finds that h y,z has a zero of multiplicity q−1−a at −z. In all of these situations it follows that h y,z has a zero of multiplicity not divisible by d = q − 1. When y = z, and (y, z) = (A(z), A(y)), therefore, the polynomial h y,z (x) is not a dth power in F[x], and has at most 4 distinct roots. In such a situation, it therefore follows from Lemma 
We may thus conclude that Θ 11 1/4 q 5/4 |S| 1/2 . A direct computation yields the following corollary. 
APPLICATION TO PRIVACY AMPLIFICATION
Following [7] , we define a privacy amplification protocol (P A , P B ), executed by two parties Alice and Bob sharing a secret X ∈ {0, 1} n , in the presence of an active, computationally unbounded adversary Eve, who might have some partial information E about X satisfying H ∞ (X|E) k. Informally, this means that whenever a party (Alice or Bob) does not reject, the key R output by this party is random and statistically independent of Eve's view. Moreover, if both parties do not reject, they must output the same keys R A = R B with overwhelming probability.
More formally, we assume that Eve is in full control of the communication channel between Alice and Bob, and can arbitrarily insert, delete, reorder or modify messages sent by Alice and Bob to each other. In particular, Eve's strategy P E actually defines two correlated executions (P A , P E ) and (P E , P B ) between Alice and Eve, and Eve and Bob, called "left execution" and "right execution", respectively. We stress that the message scheduling for both of these executions is completely under Eve's control, and Eve might attempt to execute a run with one party for several rounds before resuming the execution with another party. However, Alice and Bob are assumed to have fresh, private and independent random tapes Y and W , respectively, which are not known to Eve (who, by virtue of being unbounded, can be assumed deterministic). At the end of the left execution (P A (X, Y ), P E (E)), Alice outputs a key R A ∈ {0, 1} m ∪ {⊥}, where ⊥ is a special symbol indicating rejection. Similarly, Bob outputs a key R B ∈ {0, 1} m ∪ {⊥} at the end of the right execution (P E (E), P B (X, W )). We let E denote the final view of Eve, which includes E and the communication transcripts of both executions (P A (X, Y ), P E (E)) and (P E (E), P B (X, W ). We can now define the security of (P A , P B ). Our definition is based on [7] . Robustness. We start by defining the notion of preapplication robustness, which states that even if Eve is active,
. The stronger notion of post-application robustness is defined similarly, except Eve is additionally given the key R A the moment she completed the left execution (P A , P E ), and the key R B the moment she completed the right execution (P E , P B ). For example, if Eve completed the left execution before the right execution, she may try to use R A to force Bob to output a different key R B ∈ {R A , ⊥}, and vice versa. Extraction. Given a string r ∈ {0, 1} m ∪ {⊥}, let purify(r) be ⊥ if r =⊥, and otherwise replace r =⊥ by a fresh m-bit random string U m : purify(r) ← U m . Letting E denote Eve's view of the protocol, we require that
Namely, whenever a party does not reject, its key looks like a fresh random string to Eve.
The quantity k − m is called the entropy loss and the quantity log(1/ ) is called the security parameter of the protocol.
Case of k > n/2
Given a security parameter s, Dodis and Wichs showed that a non-malleable extractor, which extracts at least 2 log n + 2s + 4 number of bits with error = 2 −s−2 , yields a two-round protocol for privacy amplification with optimal entropy loss. The protocol, which also uses any (regular) extractor Ext with optimal entropy loss and any asymptotically good one-time message-authentication code MAC (see Definition 5.7), is depicted in Figure 1 .
Using the bound from Theorem 3.3 and setting ε = 2 −s and m = s, we get the following theorem. Using this theorem, we obtain the following. Alice: X 
Case of k = δn
Here we give our protocol for arbitrary positive entropy rate. We first give some preliminaries.
Definition 5.4. An elementary somewhere-k-source is a vector of sources (X 1 , · · · , X C ), such that some X i is a k-source. A somewhere k-source is a convex combination of elementary somewhere-k-sources.
for every k-source X, the vector (X 1 , . . . , X C ) = Cond(X) is -close to a somewhere-k -source. When convenient, we call Cond a rate-(k/n → k /n , )somewhere-condenser.
We are going to use condensers recently constructed based on the sum-product theorem. Specifically, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 5.6 ( [19] , [20] , [21] ). For any δ > 0 and constant β > 0, there is an efficient family of rate-(δ → 1 − β, = 2 −Ω(δn) )-somewhere condensers Cond : {0, 1} n → ({0, 1} n ) C , where C = poly(1/δ) and n = poly(δ)n.
One-time message authentication codes (MACs) use a shared random key to authenticate a message in the information-theoretic setting. 
where R is the uniform distribution over {0, 1} .
Theorem 5.8 ([7] ). For any message length d and tag length v, there exists an efficient family of ( d v 2 −v )secure MACs with key length = 2v. In particular, this MAC is ε-secure when v = log d + log(1/ ). More generally, this MAC is also enjoys the following security guarantee, even if Eve has partial information E about its key R. Let (R, E) be any joint distribution. Then, for all attackers A 1 and A 2 ,
(In the special case when R ≡ U 2v and independent of E, we get the original bound.)
Finally, we will also need to use any strong seeded (k, )-extractor with optimal entropy loss O(log(1/ )). A simple extractor that achieves this is the one from the leftover hash lemma, which uses a linear-length seed. We can also use more sophisticated constructions such as those in [22] , [23] .
The protocol. Now we give our privacy amplification protocol for the setting when H ∞ (X|E) = k δn. We assume that the error we seek satisfies 2 −Ω(δn) < < 1/n. In the description below, it will be convenient to introduce an "auxiliary" security parameter s. Eventually, we will set s = log(C/ ) + O(1) = log(1/ ) + O(1), so that O(C)/2 s < , for a sufficiently large O(C) constant related to the number of "bad" events we will need to account for. We will need the following building blocks:
• Let Cond : {0, 1} n → ({0, 1} n ) C be a rate-(δ → 0.9, 2 −s )-somewhere-condenser. Specifically, we will use the one from Theorem 5.6, where C = poly(1/δ) = O(1), n = poly(δ)n = Ω(n) and 2 −s 2 −Ω(δn) .
• Let nmExt : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} d → {0, 1} m be a (0.9n , 2 −s )-non-malleable extractor. Specifically, we will use the one from Theorem 5.2 (which is legal since 0.9n n /2 + O(log n ) + 8s + O(1)) and set the output length m = 4s (see the description of MAC below for more on m ).
(k , 2 −s )-extractor with optimal entropy loss k − m = O(s). Specifically, we will set k = k−(7C + 11)s = k − O(s), which means that m = k − O(s) as well. We will use the notation Ext a..b (X; W ), where 1 a b m, to denote the sub-string of extracted bits from bit position a to bit position b. We assume the seed length d n. • Let MAC be the one-time, 2 −s -secure MAC for d-bit messages, whose key length = m (the output length of nmExt). Using the construction from Theorem 5.8, we set the tag length v = s + log d 2s (since d n 1/ 2 s ), which means that the key length = m = 2v 4s. • Let lrMAC be the another one-time ("leakageresilient") MAC for d-bit messages, but with tag length v = 2v 4s and key length = 2v 8s. We will later use the second part of Theorem 5.8 to argue good security of this MAC even when v bits of partial information about its key is leaked to the attacker. To not confuse the two MACs, we will use Z (instead of R) to denote the key of lrMAC and L (instead of T ) to denote the tag of lrMAC.
Using the above building blocks, the protocol is given in Figure 2 . To emphasize the presence of Eve, we will use 'prime' to denote all the protocol values seen or generated by Bob; e.g., Bob picks W 1 , but Alice sees potentially different W 1 , etc. Also, for any random variable G used in describing our protocol, we use the notation G =⊥ to indicate that G was never assigned any value, because the party who was supposed to assign G rejected earlier. The case of final keys R A and R B becomes a special case of this convention.
Our protocol proceeds in C + 1 Phases. During the first C Phases, we run C sequential copies of the tworound protocol for the entropy-rate greater than 1/2 case (see Figure 1 ), but use the derived secret X i (output by the somewhere-condenser) instead of X during the i-th run. Intuitively, since one of the values X i is expected to have entropy rate above 1/2, we hope that the key Z i extracted in this Phase is secret and uniform. However, there are several complications we must resolve to complete this template into a secure protocol.
The first complication is that Eve might not choose to execute its run with Alice in a "synchronous" manner with its execution with Bob. We prevent such behavior of Eve by introducing "liveness tests", where after each Phase Alice has to prove that she participated during that Phase. Such tests were implicit in the original paper of Renner and Wolf [6] , and made explicit by Khanakurthi and Reyzin [7] . Each liveness test (except for the last one in Phase C +1, to be discussed) consists of Bob sending Alice a seed W i for the extractor Ext (which is anyway sent during the i-th Phase), and Alice responding with the first s bits of the extracted output. Intuitively, although Eve may choose to maul the extracted seed (which might be possible for all Phases, where the entropy rate of X i is below 1/2), Eve cannot predict the correct output without asking Alice something. And since Bob does uses a new liveness test between every two Phases, this effectively forces Eve to follow a natural "synchronous" interleaving between the left and the right executions.
The second complication comes from the fact that after a "good" (rate above 1/2) Phase i is completed, the remaining phases might use low-rate sources X i+1 , . . . , X C . Hence, one needs a mechanism to make sure that once a good key is extracted in some a-priori unknown phase, good keys will be extracted in future phases as well, even if the remaining derived sources X i have low entropy-rate. This is done by using a second message authentication code lrMAC, keyed by a value Z i−1 extracted by Bob in the previous Phase (i − 1), to authenticated the seed W i sent in Phase i. The only subtlety is that Bob still sends the original MAC of W i , and this MAC might be correlated with the previous extracted key Z i−1 (especially if the Phase i uses "bad-rate" X i ). Luckily, by using the "leakage-resilient" property of our second MAC (stated in Theorem 5.8), and setting the parameters accordingly, we can ensure that Z i−1 has enough entropy to withstand the "leakage" of the original MAC of W i .
The template above already ensures the robustness of the protocol, if we were to extract the key Z C (or Z C for Bob) derived at the end of Phase C. Unfortunately, it does not necessarily ensure that Alice outputs a random key (i.e., it does not guarantee the extraction property for Alice). Specifically, by making Alice's execution run faster than Bob's execution, it might be possible for Eve to make Alice successfully accept a non-random seed W C , resulting in non-random key Z C . Intuitively, since all the X i 's except for one might have low entropy rate, our only hope to argue security should come from the non-malleability on nmExt in the "good" Phase i. However, since Bob is behind (say, at Phase j < i) Alice during the good Phase i, Bob will use a wrong source Alice: X Eve: E Bob: X (X 1 , . . . X C ) = Cond(X). Phase 1 (X 1 , . . . X C ) = Cond(X). Sample random Y 1 .
Phases 2..C For i = 2 to C For i = 2 to C Sample random Y i .
Sample random W i . S i−1 = Ext 1..s (X; W i−1 ). X j for the non-malleable extractor, and we cannot use the non-malleability of nmExt to argue that Eve cannot fool Alice into accepting a wrong seed W i (and, then, wrong W i+1 , . . . , W C ). Of course, in this case we know Bob will eventually reject, since Eve won't be able to answer the remaining liveness tests. However, Alice's key Z C is still non-random, violating extraction. This is the reason for introducing the last Phase C + 1. During this phase Alice (rather than Bob) picks the last seed W C+1 and uses it to extract her the final key R A . Therefore, R A is now guaranteed to be random. However, now we need to show how to preserve robustness and Bob's extraction. This is done by Alice sending the MAC of W C+1 using they key Z C she extracted during the previous round. (We call this MAC S C rather than T C+1 , since it also serves as a liveness test for Alice during Phase (C + 1).) From the previous discussion, we know that, with high probability, (a) either Z C is non-random from Eve's perspective, but then Bob will almost certainly reject (ensuring robustness and preserving Bob's extraction); or (b) Z C = Z C is random and secret from Eve, in which case the standard MAC security suffices to ensure both robustness and Bob's extraction.
The detailed analysis of the protocol appears in the full version [12] .
FUTURE DIRECTIONS
There are several natural open questions. First, can we give a non-malleable extractor which outputs even one bit for entropy rate below 1/2? As far as we know, it is possible that our extractor works for lower min-entropy (although the Cohen-Raz-Segev extractor [11] in full generality does not). Second, can we achieve optimal round complexity (2 rounds) and entropy loss (O(s)) for weak secrets with arbitrarily linear entropy δn? In principle, this problem would be solved if an efficient non-malleable extractor is constructed for entropy rate below 1/2. Finally, can we generalize our techniques to sublinear entropy?
